BOOK REVIEW
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LAW. Edited by Arthur Selwyn
Miller and Martin Feinrider. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood
Press, 1984. Pp. xiii, 415.
Although physicians and scientists have been debating the wisdom of nuclear weapons policy for quite a while, the legal community has been conspicuously absent from the debate. Why lawyers
have remained quiet, though, is not immediately apparent. Certainly in the past they have contributed actively to the development of a jurisprudence of international legal restraints on war,
perhaps most notably in the development of the Nuremburg Principles following World War II.1 According to the foreword of Nuclear Weapons and Law, the editors hope that their collection of
essays will stimulate the legal community into joining the debate.2
The first twelve essays address the legality of nuclear weapons
under international law. In his essay, Richard Bilder3 provides a
general description of the problem and outlines the provisions of
nuclear arms limitation agreements to date. Although he rejects
the idea that nuclear arms are illegal per se, he outlines useful international legal arguments supporting arms control. Another
writer, Dinesh Khosla, 4 warns against any hope that the International Court of Justice might declare nuclear weapons illegal. Instead, he suggests that the role of international law and lawyers is
to persuade governments both to take responsibility for their actions and to assume the risk of removing nuclear weapons and
their concomitant threat to human society.
Elliot Meyrowitz 5 authored a lengthy summary of traditional international law in an attempt to rebut the idea that international
law and the laws of war offer no express prohibition against the use
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of nuclear weapons. He analogizes a number of treaties and conventions which limit the destructive force of weapons, such as
chemical and biological warfare, to cover nuclear weapons. Unlike
other weapons, he notes, the effects of nuclear warfighting cannot
be limited to the combatant nations. Neutral states would suffer
from the environmental effects of nuclear war nearly as much as
the belligerents-a clear violation of longstanding respect for the
welfare of noncombatant states. He then continues beyond the
condemnation of first use of nuclear weapons in war and examines
whether the state may use nuclear weapons even in exercising its
right of self-defense.
John Norton Moore's brief essay is essentially a rejoinder to the
preceding one by Professor Meyrowitz. Professor Moore points out
several inconsistencies in Meyrowitz's facts regarding international
agreements and treaties on the destructive force of weapons which
seem to blunt the forcefulness of the agreements' application to
nuclear weapons. Moore fears that calling nuclear weapons illegal
would lead to destabilization of the current world situation. Instead, he favors deterrence through the maintenance of a nuclear
arsenal steadily reduced by further arms control negotiation between superpowers. In keeping with this theme of deterrence as
necessity, Harry Almond, Jr.,7 examines the interrelationship of
law, strategy, deterrence, and defense. In his view, arms control
and deterrence do nothing to affect the relations between rivals.
Rather, he sees arms control and deterrence simply as a way of
maintaining a check and balance on the development of military
technology between superpowers. Accordingly, until the rivals can
improve their trust of each other, nuclear weapons will remain a
fact of life.
In an essay which can be best described as a hybrid of the international and constitutional law aspects of nuclear weapons, Martin
Feinrider 8 reviews the history of the incorporation of international
law into American law. He surveys the international law which now
may be used to limit the use or deployment of nuclear weapons. In
addition to the international law previously cited by Meyrowitz,
Feinrider cites nuclear weapons as a violation of human rights and
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the natural law right to survival. He also introduces the reader to
the concept of the right to peace as a basic human right, a concept
which has received much attention in Europe but has emerged
only recently in the United States.' Despite his arguments against
nuclear weapons, his analysis does not rule out all uses of nuclear
weapons. Feinrider shifts the burden of persuasion, however, to
nuclear weapons proponents to acquire legal sanction for the remaining uses.
In view of the tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons,
Richard Falk' ° rejects Feinrider's idea that legitimizing some uses
of nuclear weapons would create a loophole allowing the rationalization of virtually all uses. Indeed, he urges that approval of the
use of nuclear weapons under any type of international law creates
an acceptability which will promote nuclear warfighting doctrines.
Instead, he suggests that all uses of nuclear weapons be viewed as
violating international law, essentially making it illegal to base national security on first-use options or threats of use of nuclear
weapons.
Michael Reisman" offers a brief caveat to claims of illegality of
nuclear weapons. Rather than looking to old cases and texts of the
laws of war, Reisman examines the present situation-namely the
actions of politicians who are building nuclear weapons and the
popular perception that to do so must be acceptable. He sides with
Professor Almond's idea that in order to get rid of these weapons,
the entire system will have to change. He suggests that a nuclear
weapons ban will require not only a treaty that is verifiable in
peace but also one that works in a crisis situation.
Burns Weston1 2 concentrates on whether nuclear weapons comport with the laws of war. In an exhaustive analysis of the legality
of weapons use, Weston examines a wide variety of nuclear
warfighting scenarios. He rebuts arguments that humanitarian
rules of war do not apply to nuclear weapons. Indeed, he finds that
the laws of war do apply and that they severely restrict the use of
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nuclear weapons. Continuing in this vein, B.V.A. Roling"3 reviews
the right of states to start a war, the laws of war, and the role of
international law in arms control and disarmament. He proposes
that the United Nations take a more active role in outlining arms
control and disarmament agreements. He views the emergence of
nuclear weapons as strengthening the need for a total prohibition
of war.
The section of international law essays closes with a hortatory
tract by Saul Mendlovitz" urging lawyers to join with the general
public in creating a political climate which will allow the world to
begin to move away from nuclear weapons and toward peace. The
essays are followed by Carol Roehrendbeck's 5 bibliography which
lists materials regarding international law and nuclear weapons.
The bibliography is annotated and provides a useful collection of
resources for persons wishing to pursue this topic.
The second main section of the book covers nuclear weapons and
American constitutional law. The format differs slightly from that
of the first section; the essays are all written as responses to an
initial essay by Arthur Selwyn Miller."6 In the lead piece, Professor
Miller presents possible constitutional arguments against the use
of nuclear weapons. Although he states that the Constitution cannot be used to find nuclear weapons illegal per se, he does find a
number of ways in which the Constitution might be brought to
bear on the subject. He focuses on congressional war powers, on
the power of Congress to punish offenses against the law of nations, on the incorporation of international law into United States
law, and on the affirmative duty of government to enact laws which
protect its citizens.
Two of the respondents supplement Miller's constitutional arguments with ideas of their own. Aviam Soifer 17 begins his discussion
not on the main text of the Constitution but on the preamble's call
to secure "the blessing of liberty to ourselves and our posterity."
He interprets this passage as morally binding the current generation to preserve the inheritance of those who follow. He also points
to the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amend" Professor

Emeritus of International Law and Polemology (peace research) at the Uni-

versity of Groningen in the Netherlands.
," Professor of Law at the Rutgers (Newark) S.I. Newhouse Center for Law and Justice.
15Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Law Library at the Nova University
Center for the Study of Law.
" Professor Emeritus at the George Washington University National Law Center.
" Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law.

1985]

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LAW

ment as a promising area for study in protecting the rights of future citizens. According to Milner Ball's"s essay, the question is not
whether nuclear weapons are constitutional; rather he describes
them as deconstitutionalizing or anti-constitutional, that is, that
the use of them would end law. He urges that lawyers examine the
procedural aspects of the deployment and use of nuclear weapons.
Most of the essayists reject Professor Miller's ideas outright.
Stanley Brubaker's finds that Professor Miller's constitutional arguments are wholly improper for judicial enforcement. He also rejects the applicability of international law since the Supreme Court
has stated that Congress has the authority to violate international
law and even international treaties. Jack Goldklang2 e continues
along this same theme, pointing out that in spite of what is known
about the effects at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Congress has continued to appropriate money for all types of nuclear weapons systems.
He also believes that when the President and Congress are acting
so closely in concert, international norms stand little chance of being substituted for the decisions of that powerful alliance. William
H. Taft IV, 2 1 responding on behalf of the Department of Defense,
dismisses Professor Miller's arguments simply by referring to the
article IV provision which calls for the government to protect the
states against invasion. Iredell Jenkins 22 bases his argument
against constitutional strictures on the observation that Congress
cannot remove all the threat presented by nuclear weapons
throughout the world. He criticizes Professor Miller for failing to
provide any specified action the Supreme Court might pursue in
telling Congress how to eliminate this threat. He questions the wisdom of involving the Court in foreign policy, a realm traditionally
occupied by the President and Congress. Further, he doubts
whether even a favorable ruling by the Supreme Court would have
public approval and moral impact in view of the decline of the
moral authority of the Court in the public's eyes. Although
Fletcher Baldwin, Jr.,23 would like to see the issue of nuclear weapons use argued in the Supreme Court, he describes that body as
"ill-equipped intellectually, procedurally, and emotionally to hear
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this type of case which would require creative thinking to an extreme degree."
Two essayists focus on the war powers of Congress. Dean Alfange, Jr.,2 ' suggests that there is no guarantee that the Supreme
Court would be any better or more responsive than the Congress or
the President in starting the turn away from nuclear weapons. Indeed, he believes that if the Court should find that any particular
use of nuclear weapons is legal, the debate would essentially end.
He reasons that because Congress has the power to declare war
under the Constitution, that body has the power to select the
weapons. Rather than go to the Court before there has been a failure in the legislative process, he favors an examinination not of the
consitutionality but of the wisdom of our nuclear weapons policy.
Thomas Frank 25 provides a useful analysis of the constitutional division of war powers between the President and Congress. The
gray area he finds regarding the concurrent powers may allow Congress to control the deployment and use of nuclear weapons in the
same way as it has controlled troop deployment in the past.
Although most of the essayists reject Professor Miller's constitutional analysis in whole or in part, most of them realize the importance of stimulating public interest and involvement in the policymaking process. Ovid Lewis 26 ultimately puts the burden on the
public to make the policy decision. Arval Morris 27 sees Professor
Miller's contribution as being the stimulation of public interest
and discussion rather than a test case in the Supreme Court. Many
of the essayists express the hope that lawyers will join the debate
and use their skills to effect a change in policy. Professor Miller's
reply to the essays is that the Constitution should be seen as a
living document capable of reinterpretation by each generation.
Additionally, he warns that his arguments should not be dismissed
as merely "political" since every decisionmaking body is bound up
in politics, including the Supreme Court.
The final two essays in the book concern the environmental and
medical effects of nuclear war. Both are good summaries but are
much too brief to offer very much detail.28 An annotated bibliogra24 Professor
of Political Science and Acting Chancellor at
Massachusetts.
15 Professor of Law at the New York University School of Law.

the University

of

Dean and Professor of Law at the Nova University Center for the Study of Law.
Professor of Law at the University of Washington School of Law.
I For greater details about the environmental and medical effects of nuclear war, see P.
EHRLICH, C. SAGAN, D. KENNEDY, & W. ROBERTS, THE COLD AND THE DARK (1984) (discussing
'

:7

1985]

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND- LAW

421

phy similar to the one in the international law section would have
benefited the readers.
Professor Miller urges the reader to view these essays not as definitive works but as an attempt to encourage the public in general
and lawyers in particular to examine the ways in which they think
about nuclear weapons. Selections from the book would be very
useful for classroom discussions in international law and constitutional law courses both in law schools and in history and political
science programs. Whatever the flaws may be in its reasoning, the
book edited by Professors Miller and Feinrider provides the opening for a new dialogue on nuclear weapons and the law.
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